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388 abstract
This paper represents the first comprehensive effort to provide a theoretical and 
empirical explanation of systemic corruption in Croatian local government. It 
follows the logic of the selectorate theory, according to which staying in power for 
long periods of time depends on creating a small group of loyal but powerful 
supporters (the winning coalition). Mayors that exist within such environments 
not only maximize their chances of staying in power; they also engage in greater 
corruption and set higher taxes. Its citizens are stuck in a negative spiral of 
corruption, high taxes, and a politician that regardless of this keeps winning 
elections. The paper makes two main contributions to the current literature. First 
it provides a theoretical extension of the selectorate theory to Croatian local 
government by explicitly modeling the link between corruption and winning 
coalitions, and second, it empirically verifies the theoretical findings using a novel 
matching approach called entropy balancing. 
Keywords: political economy, winning coalition, selectorate theory, corruption, 
taxes
1 IntRoDUctIon
Corruption in Croatia is systemic, embedded deeply in the core of both national 
and local politics, and consequently of the domestic economy. Politicians holding 
power have developed and successfully maintained a crony system that helps 
them win office and reward their loyal cronies with exclusive deals and political 
protection. The result is a system where competitive advantage on the market is 
achieved mainly because of political connections instead of competence. Existing 
within such a crony microcosm enables a politician freely to extract rents, not 
having to worry about being punished by the voters. 
The best way to illustrate this is with a few examples. Over the past two electoral 
cycles a number of mayors from major Croatian cities (Zagreb, Dubrovnik, Zadar, 
Varaždin, Vukovar, and the Sisak-Moslavina County) originating from both 
center-left and center-right political parties were arrested or indicted on corruption 
charges for abuse of power, bribery, and making favorable deals with selected 
private firms. They were either convicted or are still in trial. The Dubrovnik mayor 
was found guilty, served his sentence of six months of probation and then came 
back to win a local by-election in 2015 (Tomičić, 2015). The coalition government 
passed a special law in the months prior to the regular 2017 local election with the 
sole purpose of preventing him from running and most likely winning again 
(Romić, 2016). The mayor of Zagreb, in power for 16 years, after being arrested 
was immediately bailed out after paying the largest ever bail of 15 million kuna, 
arrested again for breaking his probation by intimidating witnesses, bailed out 
again after a few months thanks to a very quick Constitutional Court decision in 
his favor, and is still due to face trial on various charges (Petrušić, 2015). None of 
this prevented him from running in the parliamentary elections in 2015 (regular) 
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389parliament, or from winning a new four-year term as mayor in the 2017 local elec-
tions. For this entire period, even when he was in jail for six months, he was still 
the official mayor of Zagreb. These are just two of the most egregious cases that 
suggest there is something very wrong with how Croatian voters perceive corrupt 
politicians. 
Why don’t voters in Croatia punish their politicians for corruption? Many Croa-
tian politicians have held their local offices for more than 20 years (the average 
tenure is over 10 years!). Have these politicians managed to design a system of 
key supporters so powerful and so efficient that even after being arrested or even 
convicted, they can still remain in power? Can political economy theory in any 
way explain these outcomes in which politicians in Croatia can stay in power for 
long periods of time with virtually no accountability to their voters? Who are they 
accountable to if not the voters? 
This paper aims to provide both a theoretical and empirical explanation of sys-
temic corruption in Croatian local government. The underlying theoretical logic 
of the paper is based on the selectorate theory from Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2002, 2005). The selectorate theory suggests that politicians can stay in power for 
long periods of time and simultaneously extract rents and shun any accountability 
if they create a powerful enough group of key supporters. This relationship pro-
vides mutual benefits to all players: the politicians stay in power while the sup-
porters get direct benefits, either in favorable legislation, exclusive procurement 
contracts, jobs in the public sector, etc. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Verdier, 1995; 
Root and Nellis, 2000; Faccio, 2006). Accordingly politicians are free to extract 
rents without hurting their election chances if they operate in small winning coali-
tion environments within large electorates. In other words, the smaller the group 
of key supporters that delivers votes with respect to the entire electorate, the easier 
it is for a politician to bind the networks of key supporters to himself and hence 
maximize his chances of staying in power. Another unique prediction of the selec-
torate theory is that in small winning coalition environments a politician is free to 
impose higher taxes in order to fund the allocation of public resources towards 
private interests. Theoretical implications similar to those of the selectorate theory 
were given by North, Wallis and Weingeist (2009). They define such an environ-
ment as a typical limited access order in which institutions are personalized so 
that all political and economic outcomes depend on close interpersonal relation-
ships between the ruling elites and various powerful groups that support them. 
The empirical part of the paper proves the given theoretical predictions. It shows 
that Croatian systemic corruption can indeed best be explained by the selectorate 
theory, where longevity in office is dependent upon having small winning coali-
tion environments and hence greater opportunities for corruption. Furthermore, 
mayors in small winning coalition cities or municipalities set higher local taxes. 
The greater the corruption of a mayor, the higher the tax rate he or she sets. There-
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390 stay in power longer, be more corrupt, manipulate corruption to keep himself in 
office, and keep tax rates high. Lack of accountability in such environments will 
enable the mayor to get away with it, thus sending the entire community down a 
negative spiral of poor governance and loyal supporters of bad politicians.
The paper delivers two main contributions. First, it provides a theoretical exten-
sion of the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) theory by establishing a direct link 
between the winning coalition and corruption. The selectorate theory accounts for 
this link indirectly, by explaining the motivation for higher corruption in small 
winning coalition systems. Leaders within small winning coalitions use corrup-
tion to reward their crony supporters, they use it to finance their own kleptocratic 
aspirations, and they discourage any attempt to reduce corruption as this strength-
ens the rule of law, thus weakening their hold on power. The theory therefore does 
predict a greater motivation for corruption, but it does not model it explicitly nor 
does it test empirically. This is the second contribution of the paper – its empirical 
verification of the theory and its main findings in the case of Croatia. It uses a 
direct proxy for corruption that confirms the motivation provided by the original 
selectorate theory. 
In the following sections the paper first presents the underlying logic of the selec-
torate theory in section 2, after which it creates a new model in section 3 to explic-
itly define the relationship between winning coalition size and corruption. These 
two sections offer direct testable hypotheses for the empirical part of the paper. 
Section 4 lists the sources of data and describes the process of coding the main 
variables. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and the subsequent results for 
each of the main theoretical implications. Section 6 concludes. 
2 tHeoRetIcal fRaMeWoRK: selectoRate tHeoRY
According to the selectorate theory, defined and introduced by Bueno de Mes-
quita et al. (2002, 2005), politicians win office and stay in power for long periods 
of time if they are integrated enough into the system, or in other words, if they 
create a powerful enough group of supporters/voters they can buy with various 
concessions, and which in return offer them persistent political support – the so 
called winning coalition (W). 
A winning coalition represents a group of voters essential for the politician to keep 
hold of power. This may include various influential organizations and interest 
groups such as unions, religious groups, civil society groups, entrepreneurs, or 
even the police and the army in autocratic regimes. A winning coalition is a subset 
of a larger group called the selectorate (S) representing all voters eligible to vote 
in a society. The smaller the winning coalition with respect to the size of the selec-
torate (the so-called W/S ratio), the greater the chances of political survival. This 
is due to the fact that members of small winning coalitions can easily be replaced 
by members outside of the coalition if they fail to remain loyal. The costs of defec-
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391leges and benefits). This testifies to a mutually dependent relationship between 
political elites and the groups they choose to include in their winning coalitions. 
The main emphasis of the selectorate theory is to explain how the existence of a 
small coalition in a large electorate induces a lack of political accountability to the 
voters, which further leads to a lack of transparency in public decision making, the 
personalization of institutions, and the creation of clientelistic relationships that 
secure re-election. In environments with really small winning coalitions and large 
selectorates, like autocracies, politicians in power use private goods to satisfy 
their coalition members. In larger coalition environments, like democracies, poli-
ticians use public goods to satisfy a wide enough number of citizens for electoral 
support, which often implies an interconnection with corporate interests in the 
form of campaign donations and lobbying, and returning the favor via favorable 
legislation (McChesney, 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Faccio, 2006). The 
logic of political survival is the same in both systems; create a group of essential 
people powerful enough to secure reelection, and reward them with either direct 
monetary benefits, or indirect concessions. 
Politicians in democracies can also use the support of so-called key members of 
the group within their winning coalitions. These are individuals who influence a 
large number of people and thus carry a greater weight in the electoral process. 
For example, politicians in democracies use the support of labor union leaders, 
which secures large amounts of votes by utilizing union membership. Politicians 
return the favor by rewarding the union leader, which effectively reduces the cost 
of maintaining the winning coalition. Despite the perception of a large coalition of 
voters who support them, they actually have a very small coalition made up of 
only a few key members. Other examples are military generals in autocracies, 
religious leaders, or even representatives of various ethnic groups, which in cer-
tain countries (or areas) are “worth” a significant number of votes. 
Business interests can also influence the creation of small winning coalitions, 
where politicians reward entrepreneurs within the coalition by giving them 
exclusive government contracts via fraudulent public procurement procedures 
(Bandiera, Prat and Valletti, 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). In return, the quasi-
entrepreneurs, as key members of their own networks, use their influence to secure 
votes for the politicians. It is in the best interest of such corruptly-intralinked 
quasi-entrepreneurs for their politician to remain in power as long as possible 
(Verdier, 1995; Root and Nellis, 2000). 
One of the main drawbacks of the selectorate theory is that its assumptions rest 
upon rational choice theory which assumes complete information and perfectly 
rational agents. This implies that not all of its theoretical findings will be sup-
ported in the data. In line with that critique Clarke and Stone (2008) find that its 
empirical results do suffer from an omitted variable bias, while Gallagher and 

































































41 (4) 387-420 (2017)
392 and that it fails to fully explain outcomes in autocratic regimes. Nevertheless, 
even though the theory is not a magic bullet for understanding democracies and 
dictatorships, it does offer an excellent framework for a testing ground. 
An approach similar to the selectorate theory was developed by North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009) through their theory of the institutional development of a society 
with respect to its response to violence. The authors define an institutional frame-
work in which well-organized ruling elites can manipulate the economy by gener-
ating privileges based on the personalization of governing institutions. They call 
it a limited access order. In such systems the base of organization in a society is 
intrapersonal relationships between the powerful and the political elites, which 
successfully discourage the development of civil society and ensure long-term 
persistence of the constellation of political relationships. When the institutions of 
a system are depersonalized it is much harder to create clientelistic relationships. 
This is the case of an open access order, in which the foundation of intrapersonal 
interactions is a well-defined, depersonalized legal framework, and not politically 
generated privileges. Ivanković and Šonje (2011) use the framework set out in 
North et al. (2009) to define Croatia as a system of “undemocratic capitalism” 
in which institutions are personalized and there is a delicate balance of power 
between politics and politically-generated winners. 
Croatia is therefore a good candidate for analysis under the selectorate theory 
framework, particularly its local government, in which mayors are allowed to stay 
in power indefinitely. In addition, the new electoral system imposed in 2009 rede-
fined electoral rules to allow mayors to be elected directly (prior to 2009, voters 
voted for parties, where the mayor was usually the leader of the local party 
branch). This created some institutional limits for mayors, but it arguably gave 
them even more direct power than before. 
Furthermore, Croatia is a country prone to corruption and budgetary misappro-
priation. It ranks among the five most corrupt EU member states (along with 
Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, and Romania) (European Commission, 2014), while 
Transparency International (2016) gives it an average score of 49 out of 100, mak-
ing it a mostly corrupt country. There is ample research done in Croatia that con-
firms this. Bićanić (1997), Franičević (1997), Madžarević-Šujster and Mikulić 
(2002), Bejaković (2002), and Ott (2002) have all tried to measure and explain the 
extent of Croatia’s grey economy and its systemic corruption. Štulhofer (2004) 
analyzes its impact on Croatia’s depleting social capital and Budak and Rajh 
(2012) on the trust in the country’s institutions. Bađun (2011) has shown a posi-
tive correlation between public investment spending and corruption, Ateljević and 
Budak (2010) successfully uncover corruption practices in domestic public pro-
curement tenders, while Mačkić (2014) finds evidence of local political business 
cycles in Croatian cities that indicate opportunistic and rent-seeking behavior of 
politicians. Each of these research efforts painted an individual piece of the puzzle 
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393tion, and lack of transparency. This paper aims to connect all the dots and provide 
an explanation rooted in the selectorate theory that can explain Croatia’s persis-
tently bad outcomes when it comes to dealing with bad politicians. 
3 MoDel
One thing that is missing from the theoretical predictions of the selectorate theory is 
an explicit link between small winning coalitions and corruption. It confirms em-
pirically that winning coalition size matters for taxation and political longevity in 
office but apart from justifying the motivation for corruption in kleptocratic regimes, 
it does not include a precise prediction on how winning coalition size is suppose to 
impact the potential corruption of politicians in power in democratic systems. This 
section combines the local government political alignment model of Brollo and 
Nannicini (2012) with the simple probabilistic voting model of Persson and Tabel-
lini (2000) in order to make a theoretical extension to the selectorate theory. 
The model starts by defining the incumbent mayor objective function. Politicians 
holding local power engage in corruption for two reasons: (1) to maximize their 
welfare (via obtaining rents), and (2) to maximize their probability of winning by 
buying the electoral support of key members of the winning coalition (Besley, 
2006; Ferejohn, 1986; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The objective function of 
the mayor in power can then be defined as:
   (1)
Where ri represents total rents received by a politician i during the entire term in 
office. The second term denotes the probability of winning for the politician (vote 
share VtI for the incumbent I in election year t needs to be higher than 1/2 to win). 
This is a probabilistic function that is further defined below. The final term repre-
sents a budget constraint, where t denotes the local tax rate1, and y(ri) is total 
income, which is by definition a negative function of rents. This means that gre-
ater rent extraction will lower incomes of the population, encouraging a negative 
reaction from voters which lowers political utility. The budget constraint therefore 
represents the opportunity cost of rents. 
Before performing the maximization of this objective function with respect to 
rents, we must first express the probability of winning for the local incumbent 
party as a function of vote share and rent-extraction. The vote share of the incum-
bent party can be expressed by: 
   (2)
The first term VtI-1 is the vote share of the incumbent party in the previous election 
depicting the simple incumbency advantage (a typical implication of the political 
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394 science literature, e.g. Gelman and King, 1991; Ansolabahere and Snyder, 2002; 
or Lee, 2008). The final term is a random stochastic shock ε distributed normally 
on , and it represents all the possible factors that could influence 
electoral chances apart from rents (corruption) and the incumbency advantage 
(such as ideological preferences of the voters, specific politician idiosyncrasies, 
informational asymmetry, better campaign, more experience, etc.). The middle 
term represents a unique prediction of the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 2005): negative rents squared (following the logic of concave rent-extrac-
tion, according to which too much in rents can reduce vote share at the election) 
multiplied by the ratio of the winning coalition (W) over the entire selectorate (S). 
The smaller the winning coalition with respect to the selectorate (i.e. for low 
levels of W/S), the greater the scope for corruption, and the higher the probability 
of winning. Small coalition environments are characterized by low levels of trans-
parency and political accountability, and hence greater scope for corruption. On 
the other hand, in such environments it is much easier for an incumbent politician 
to gather a small winning coalition of key supporters, enough to keep him in 
power, whilst distributing budgetary funds both to them and himself. Therefore in 
equation (2) a small W/S ratio will imply a lower punishment for corruption, 
whereas a large W/S ratio implies greater punishment, reducing the incentives for 
corruption. We should observe higher corruption in small winning coalition envi-
ronments, and lower corruption in large winning coalition environments. 
The probability of winning for the mayor is the probability that more than half of 
the electorate2 votes for him; . 
   (3)
    (4)
Given that this is a probabilistic voting function based on Persson and Tabellini 
(2000), the winning probability becomes a particular point on the cumulative 
distribution function of μ:
   (5)
   (6)
2 In reality, with multiple party races it takes much less than 50% of the electoral vote to win. A random 
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395Which yields the following probabilistic function continuous in ri:
   (7)
We can now insert this into the government objective function from equation (1), 
and formulate the following maximization problem of the incumbent:
   (8)
The first order condition is:
   (9)
For which we get:
   (10)
which holds if  <0,1>, and if W, S > 0. Total rents can therefore be ex-
pressed as a function of the opportunity cost of rents, the W/S ratio, and the distri-
bution of the asymmetric shock, σ. According to equation (10), rents increase 
when the winning coalition is small  , adhering to the logic of the selector-
ate theory, and when asymmetric shocks are large . The distribution of 
 implies that a σ value approaching 0 entails a wide shock, which 
could mean a greater difference in political abilities of candidates, a high level of 
informational asymmetry (lack of transparency), or high levels of ideological uni-
formity which also induces lack of transparency and hence encourages rent-ex-
traction. The implication is that, for example, with large differences in ideology 
between the incumbent and the challenger in an ideologically uniform city or 
municipality, mayors can get away with corrupt activities more easily. The empiri-
cal section approximates σ as political polarization which measures ideological 
uniformity of a city or municipality. 
The model allows us to draw several important empirical implications from this 
extension to the selectorate theory. The first is that a small W/S ratio is good for 
rents, meaning that we should observe greater corruption in small winning coali-
tion environments. In addition, higher levels of political polarization, higher local 
taxes, and greater total income should all increase the scope for corruption. This 
is explicitly tested and proven in the empirical section. Second, the selectorate 
theory itself implies that small winning coalition environments are supposed to 
result in higher taxes and longer years in power of an incumbent politician. This 
too, although not modeled, is explicitly tested for and proven in the empirical part 
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396 4 Data anD VaRIables
The dataset comprises several main variables: the W/S ratio, proxy for corruption, 
local income tax surcharge rates, political re-election, and total years in power. 
This section describes the data sources as well as the operationalization of each 
variable (a table of all variables used, summarizing their definitions and sources is 
available in the appendix). 
The main independent variable in testing each theoretical hypothesis is the W/S 
ratio: the winning coalition divided by the entire selectorate. While measuring the 
size of the selectorate (S) is rather straightforward (total number of eligible 
voters), measuring the winning coalition requires some approximation. One way 
of doing so would be to look at the absolute number of voters who voted for the 
incumbent mayor. Defining a winning coalition (W) this way does not necessarily 
include only politically-connected voters, but it does show how many voters the 
incumbent managed to attract, some of whom were certainly politically connected. 
In other words the absolute number of voters who voted for the incumbent includes 
a subset of politically-connected voters, but not every vote for the mayor came 
from his loyal cronies. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) approximate the winning 
coalition in a similar way, particularly in cases of democratic countries. The W/S 
ratio therefore captures the ratio of votes for the incumbent candidate over the 
total number of eligible voters in a local unit. It is a continuous variable with a 
mean of 0.27 and standard deviation of 0.1. The mean value of 0.27 is a good 
representation of what the W/S ratio actually stands for, as it implies that an 
incumbent needs only 27% of those eligible to vote to cast their vote for him or 
her to win a local unit. This means that, on average, politicians have a rather low 
voter base they need to satisfy in order to win. For example, the minimum value 
of 3.4% is a particularly worrisome number, given that politicians in this city or 
municipality can easily manipulate a small subset of voters into their winning 
coalitions. The point of the ratio is therefore to show how likely it is for a crucial 
group of politically-connected voters to generate more clout in local low-turnout 
environments. 
In addition to taking the W/S ratio at face value it makes sense to separate it based 
on its median value (0.26) in order to distinguish between large and small W/S 
environments, and thus code them as an indicator as well (W/S_binary). The 
median is taken so as to generate a binary indicator with exactly one half of all 
cities and municipalities on either side of the cutoff. This will be used as a robust-
ness check of the validity of the indicator. 
Corruption in itself is very difficult to measure, primarily since anyone engaged in 
corrupt activities has every incentive to hide them. The proxy for corruption was 
taken from Vuković (2017) at the level of 556 cities and municipalities in Croatia. 
The original source of this data was the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croa-
tia, and its registry of public procurement. It contained more than 35,000 contracts 
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397all contracts was 28,765 billion kuna. Each corruption proxy was created as the 
ratio of suspicious procurement contracts to total procurement contracts in a given 
city or municipality for the entire 4-year period. 
The definition of a suspicious procurement entails several different categories. 
The main three characteristics of a corrupt procurement include: 
 – cases in which firms with zero employees won multiple public tenders (fake 
firms),
 – cases in which the value of the procurement contracts exceeds the annual 
average revenues of a firm (several categories are used), and 
 – cases in which the value of the contract is being given to firms with losses, 
where the contract covers the entire loss and enables the firm to operate at a 
profit in the following year.
In this paper only the total index of corruption for each city or municipality was 
used, which is the weighted average of all previous categories of corruption (and 
their extrapolations), designed carefully so as not to include the same value more 
than once (labeled Corruption Index). The total index thus represents the finite 
level of corruption in each local unit, accounting for all potential frauds. 
It should be noted however that this index does not measure corruption directly 
(given that this is impossible without data on criminal investigations and court 
rulings), but it only offers an approximation of corruption, where any case of 
potentially fraudulent procurement offers a reasonable doubt as to the validity of 
the procedure of assigning the contract. Further justification of the usage of this 
index can be found in Vuković (2017), who cites interviews with local govern-
ment and law enforcement officials, public sector bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs 
in legitimizing the usage of the aforementioned characteristics in describing 
potential corruption. 
The next set of data was local electoral results. These were taken from the State 
Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia (DIP, 2014) for the following 
elections for all 556 Croatian cities and municipalities: local elections in 2009 and 
2013, and parliamentary elections in 2011. The variables for political use were 
taken from Glaurdić and Vuković (2016, 2017). These include a number of politi-
cal and mayoral characteristics: turnout in the 2013 local election (Turnout), vote 
share of parties and candidates received in the 2011 national election (HDZ and 
SDP vote share), political experience (Years in power), political polarization 
(EPI), size of governing coalition in 2009 (Size of gov coalition), mayor majority 
in 2009 (Mayor majority), size of local assembly (Assembly size), an indicator of 
whether the mayor was from the same party that held national power (Mayor gov), 
and an indicator variable of re-election (Re-election). A few of these require 
further clarification. The indicator of re-election assigns the value of 1 if a local 
mayor was re-elected or, in cases where the mayor retired or left for higher office, 
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398 cases. Political polarization was measured as an index of vote share between two 
major political blocs3; the left and the right, within a given local unit. The larger 
the index the greater the difference between the two electoral blocs (the more 
ideologically uniform a local unit), whereas a small difference depicts ideologi-
cally divided municipalities with strong support for either the left or the right. 
Table 1 
Summary statistics
Variable observations Mean std. dev. Min. Max.
W/S ratio 546 0.270 0.102 0.034 0.681
W/S_binary 546 0.469 0.499 0 1
Corruption Index 546 0.083 0.127 0 0.75
Tax rate (prirez) 546 0.042 0.043 0 0.18
Re-election 546 0.731 0.444 0 1
Years in power 546 8.668 3.532 2 12
Turnout 546 0.478 0.100 0.231 0.886
HDZ vote share 546 0.206 0.115 0.003 0.675
SDP vote share 546 0.244 0.098 0.019 0.523
Mayor gov 546 0.676 0.468 0 1
Size of gov coalition 546 2.170 1.136 1 7
Mayor majority 545 0.585 0.112 0.231 1
EPI 546 0.818 0.177 0 0.996
Unemployment 546 0.193 0.093 0.04 0.567
Income per capita 546 1,696.8 438.5 519.9 2,973.6
Grants per capita 546 507.3 998.5 0 11,575.9
Croats 546 0.889 0.172 0.018 1
Average age 546 42.642 3.330 33.1 63.3
Years of education 546 9.842 0.875 5.925 12.132
War disabled per 1,000 546 8.539 8.082 0 64.98
Settlement size 546 3.006 0.545 1.65 5.78
Assembly size 546 13.385 3.897 7 51
Note: The data was collected for all 556 municipalities but 10 of them had no procurements in 
the given years so they were excluded from the dataset. Including them as a zero value does not 
influence the findings. 
Sources: See appendix. 
The size of governing coalition includes all parties which were a part of the local 
governing coalition (varying from 1 where only 1 party was holding local office 
to 7 where it took the coalition of 7 parties to get a legislative majority). This is 
not to be confused with the winning coalition, which is a more complex variable. 
3 The index is calculated using the following formula, adapted from Glaurdić and Vuković (2017) and origi-
nally proposed by Reynal-Querol’s (2002) ethnic polarization index: , where πi 
represents the proportion of votes given to three political blocs: the conservative bloc led by the HDZ contain-
ing all parties that classify as right-wing, the social-democrat bloc led by SDP containing all parties that clas-
sify as left-wing, and a few unaffiliated parties and independent candidates. This variable measures to which 
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399The size of the local assembly is measured by the number of local councilmen in 
each local legislature (varying based on population size from 7 to 51 for the capital 
Zagreb). The mayor majority measures the proportion of deputies in the local 
council that support the mayor. Each of these variables is supposed to capture how 
difficult it was for the mayor to govern. Even though after 2009 the change in the 
law gave local mayors more authority as they were being elected directly, having 
a majority in the legislative assembly was still important for a mayor to pass the 
local budget. 
Economic and demographic variables were taken from the Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS, 2011; 2013), the Croatian Unemployment Bureau (HZZ, 2014), 
and the Ministry of Finance (2014). These include data on local income tax 
surcharge rates (Tax rate – Prirez), total unemployment (Unemployment), total 
intergovernmental grants received by the local government, which are used to 
alleviate fiscal inequalities in municipalities (Grants p/c), incomes per capita 
(Income p/c), average number of Croats (Croats), average age (Average age), total 
years of education (Years of education), relative population size of a city or 
municipality (Settlement size) and total number of war-disabled as a proxy for 
casualties of the 1991-1995 Croatian Homeland War (War disabled). All the data 
are taken on the unit of cities and municipalities. Table 1 shows the summary 
statistics of each variable used. 
5 eMPIRIcal analYsIs
5.1 eMPIRIcal stRateGY
As stated in the theoretical section and derived from the model, there are three 
predicted effects of small winning coalition environments: (i) greater chances of 
political survival, (ii) higher levels of corruption, and (iii) higher tax rates. This 
section directly tests the given implications using several methodological 
approaches. It is important to note that the availability of data has limited the 
usage of time series-based approaches given that corruption data were only avail-
able during a single term of office, from 2009 to 2013. This means that the dataset 
at hand is a cross-section where levels of corruption are observed as a single time 
unit over the duration of the local mandate. This has forced the usage of all other 
independent variables as a single time point, in most cases taking 4-year averages, 
as well as looking at the value of political indicators in the 2009 elections. 
In order to prove the theoretical predictions, the first step of the empirical analysis 
is to examine the impact of small winning coalition environments on political 
tenure and chances of political survival. The following equation takes political 
longevity in office (Years in power, Ti ) as the dependent variable and the W/S ratio 
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400 Where Xi is a vector of all political, economic, and municipality-specific controls 
for city or municipality i. Political controls include the level of political polariza-
tion in a local unit (EPI), the relative size of the mayor’s majority in terms of dep-
uty support (Mayor majority), the size of the mayor’s governing coalition (Size of 
gov coalition), an indicator variable of whether the mayor was from the party that 
held national power (Mayor gov), and the corresponding vote shares of HDZ and 
SDP in the national election in 2011 to control for change in relative party positions 
on a national level (HDZ and SDP vote share). Economic controls include average 
Unemployment during the term, average Income per capita, and average Grants 
per capita received from the central government. Finally the unit-specific controls 
include for each city and municipality the total percentage of Croats, Average age, 
total Years of education, number of War disabled per local unit, local Assembly size 
and the average size of the city or municipality (Settlement size).
The second step is to test the relationship between winning coalitions and corrup-
tion. A similar equation is estimated, where the W/S ratio is again the main inde-
pendent variable, while the dependent variable is the total index of corruption per 
city or municipality i (Corruption index, ki ), featuring the same control variables 
as before:
   (12)
Additionally, following the conclusions from Vuković (2017) which shows that 
corruption entails a concave effect on chances of re-election, meaning that voters 
reward corrupt behavior up until a certain level after which they do in fact punish 
corruption, the same relationship is tested here, but with respect to varying levels 
of the W/S ratio. It takes corruption and the squared value of corruption as the 
main independent variables regressing them against the indicator variable of 
re-election:
   (13)
The same controls are used as before, however the sample is split into small and 
large winning coalition environments based on W/S_binary and the equation is 
estimated for each environment. This way it was possible to draw conclusions 
from two sets of environments: how corruption affects re-election in local units 
with small winning coalitions, and how corruption affects re-election in local 
units with large winning coalitions. The prediction from the theory is that there 
should be a positive and concave effect of corruption on re-election only in small 
winning coalition environments. Both a probit and a linear probability model 
(LPM) are used in estimating equation (13). 
Finally, the third step is to test how the W/S ratio affects local tax surcharge rates, 
where the average tax surcharge rate in the year of the election 2013, ti is taken as 
the main dependent variable (Tax rate), featuring the all the same right-hand side 
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401   (14)
All of the aforementioned equations are estimated using the simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation (except in equation 13 where a probit is used as well). 
However each of them could still be biased due to endogeneity issues. For exam-
ple, there could be an unobserved factor like a specific local mentality that is 
simultaneously affecting both a small W/S environment and a higher tendency for 
corruption or even taxation. In order words corruption and taxes could be higher 
not because of a small W/S environment, but because of something intrinsic to the 
community that we cannot observe. If this is the case then each estimated  coef-
ficient is likely to be biased. 
In order to address these concerns the empirical strategy will employ several 
matching techniques seeking to solve potential endogeneity problems and get an 
unbiased estimate of the effect a small W/S environment has on corruption, taxa-
tion, and tenure in office. Matching is a conditioning-on-observables approach 
for the estimation of causal effects, meaning that its application depends on 
selection of comparable units by the researcher. This selection depends on find-
ing a balance between a set of observable covariates in order to make the com-
parison between very similar treated and controlled units. Its primary goal is to 
establish counterfactual inference when the data are not generated by a random 
process or by an experiment. 
The key to a successful matching strategy is to achieve a balance based on the 
distribution of covariates for the treated and control units. In other words, we must 
make the treatment group as similar as possible to the control group in order to get 
a good estimate of a potential effect of the treatment on the outcome (in our case 
the impact of the W/S environment on corruption, taxation, and tenure). Therefore 
the first step before even beginning the estimation of the treatment effect is to 
generate comparable datasets of treated and control units, based on the set of 
observable covariates from the sample at hand. This paper will use several match-
ing techniques (propensity score matching, nearest neighbor matching, radius 
matching, and kernel matching) and compare the results between them as a 
robustness check. After this it will apply a much more robust method of entropy 
balancing (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013) to generate an even 
better balanced sample, and compare the results. After performing the balancing 
of the dataset, making sure that we have comparable treatment and control units, 
equations (11), (12) and (14) will be estimated again in order to get the unbiased 
average treatment effect.
In the subsequent sections we first present the initial OLS estimates for each 
effect. Section 5.5 then applies the matching strategies and estimates the same 
equations once again using a balanced dataset to get a more precise inference on 
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402 5.2 tHe W/s RatIo anD PolItIcal sURVIValTable 2 shows the results of equation (11) on how the W/S ratio impacts political 
survival. Overall the results imply that a higher W/S ratio decreases total tenure in 
office: a switch from a small winning coalition to a large winning coalition reduces 
time in office between one and one and a half years. This effect is very large given 
that the estimates are made using the period of a single political mandate. Across 
three terms in office this implies that a politician operating within a small winning 
coalition is likely to have one full term in office more than a politician operating 
within a large winning coalition. This result remains robust to the inclusion of a 
number of political, economic, and municipal-specific characteristics.
 
Table 2 
Impact of winning coalition size on tenure in power
Dependent variable: 
Years in power (Ti )
































































Controls No No No Yes
N 546 546 546 546
R2 0.1869 0.1951 0.2102 0.2194
F-test (p-value) 27.53 (0) 24.29 (0) 21.42 (0) 15.70 (0)
Note: OLS regressions performed throughout. Control variables include the municipality and 
city specific controls: Croats, Average age, Years of education, War disabled, Settlement size, 
and Assembly size. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes significance at 
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403Column (1) shows the results while including only the initial set of political vari-
ables as covariates. Moving from a local unit with a W/S ratio of 0.1 (small win-
ning coalition environment) to a local unit with a W/S ratio of 0.4 (large winning 
coalition environment) decreases tenure in office by 1 year and 3 months. Column 
(2) adds corruption to the equation, under the hypothesis that longer tenure is 
likely to be conditioned by higher corruption. This is indeed the case as greater 
levels of corruption – moving from a zero corruption local unit to a unit where 
corruption is moderate, at an index value of 0.25 – increase tenure by an average 
of 8 months. However a switch from a zero corruption to a high corruption envi-
ronment (levels of corruption at 0.5) increases tenure by 1 year and 4 months on 
average. A corrupt politician therefore stays in power longer. This also aligns well 
with the overall hypothesis that political survival is dependent to some extent on 
corruption. Interestingly the inclusion of the corruption variable decreases the 
magnitude of the W/S ratio effect, but it does not lose its statistical significance. 
Columns (3) and (4) add other economic and municipal-specific controls. In both 
cases the magnitude of the corruption effect is still roughly the same, while the 
effect of the W/S ratio varies from 1.1 to 1.5 fewer years in office for a switch 
from a small winning coalition local unit to a large winning coalition local unit. 
The control variables all exhibit an expected effect on tenure in office. In all cases, 
each additional party that is a member of the governing coalition lowers tenure by 
about 8 months. This makes sense as more parties in the governing coalition make 
that coalition unstable which affects a mayor’s probability of staying in power. 
Furthermore, a higher proportion of deputies in the local council that support the 
mayor (an increase of one standard deviation of 0.145) increases tenure between 
1.2 and 1.3 years. This is also an expected effect as more deputies from the same 
party as the mayor, the more likely that a mayor has a stable governing coalition 
in the local assembly. Essentially these two variables measure the same thing with 
an opposite sign. Interestingly a higher vote share for SDP in a local unit (a one 
standard deviation increase of 0.097) increases tenure by roughly 6 months, how-
ever this effect loses statistical significance once economic covariates are included. 
From the economic covariates, unemployment exhibits an expected negative 
effect on tenure, where higher unemployment (a one standard deviation increase 
of 0.092) in a local unit decreases time in office between 6 and 8 months on aver-
age. All of these estimated effects may seem small in absolute terms, however 
keep in mind that each is estimated during a single political term in office, so the 
effects are actually quite large. 
5.3 tHe W/s RatIo anD coRRUPtIon 
The results from section 5.2 have confirmed a positive impact of corruption on 
tenure in office, and have established that both corruption and a small winning 
coalition environment entail a positive impact on political tenure. This section 
empirically tests the second prediction of the theoretical section (and the unique 
prediction of the model) according to which small winning coalition environ-
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404 expected and hypothesized in each case a higher W/S ratio decreases total levels 
of corruption. Corruption is therefore more likely to occur in small winning coali-
tion environments. The magnitude of the effect is roughly the same across all 
regression equations. A one standard deviation increase (decrease) of the W/S ratio 
decreases (increases) corruption by 1.1 to 1.4 percentage points. 
Table 3 
Impact of winning coalition size on corruption
Dependent variable: 
corruption index (ki )








Tax rate (prirez) 0.267(0.129)**





























































Controls No No Yes Yes
N 546 546 546 546
R2 0.0498 0.0989 0.1088 0.1158
F-test (p-value) 4.56 (0) 8.54 (0) 6.90 (0) 6.99 (0)
Note: OLS regressions performed throughout. Control variables include the municipality and 
city specific controls: Croats, Average age, Years of education, War disabled, Settlement size, 
and Assembly size. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes significance at 
1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Graph 1 below plots the impact of the W/S ratio on corruption. Predicted levels of 
corruption (predicted from the estimates of column 3) are plotted on the y-axis, 
and the W/S ratio is plotted on the x-axis. As anticipated by the underlying theory 
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405Graph 1 
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W/S ratio
Note: Corruption is predicted from equation (12). 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
The theoretical prediction from the model in equation (10) was also that corrup-
tion should be higher in areas with greater political polarization ( ), i.e. in 
areas of higher ideological uniformity, and in areas with higher income and higher 
local taxes. This too has been shown in table 3. Greater political polarization, i.e. 
greater ideological uniformity of a city or municipality, results in higher corrup-
tion. This makes sense given that ideologically uniform local environments are 
likely to accept higher corruption from their local mayor if he or she comes from 
the “correct” political spectrum. Also, greater income per capita in a local unit 
implies higher corruption, whereas more grants received by a local unit (i.e. the 
poorer the city or municipality) imply lower corruption. 
The final column includes the local tax surcharge rate as an additional covariate. 
As predicted by the model in equation (10) cities or municipalities whose mayors 
set up higher tax rates tend to have greater levels of corruption. The effect is 
robust even after controlling for total tax revenues (not shown, available upon 
request). The reason for this could be simple: higher taxes imply higher revenues 
and hence more opportunities to engage in corruption. This is not necessarily a 
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406 5.3.1 corruption and re-election in large and small winning coalitions 
The previous two sections confirmed a relationship between small winning coali-
tions and political longevity as well as potential corruption. This could mean that 
the relationship between corruption and re-election is bounded and encouraged 
only within a small winning coalition environment. In order to test whether this is 
true, this section looks at the relationship between corruption and re-election in 
two different sets of winning coalition environments. It estimates equation (13) 
and follows the assumption of a quadratic relationship between corruption and 
re-election according to Vuković (2017). 
The expectation is that there will be a positive (yet non-linear) relationship between 
corruption and re-election only in small winning coalition local units (those with 
lower levels of transparency and political accountability), and that there will be no 
such relationship in local units with a larger winning coalition (which have higher 
levels of transparency and political accountability). 
Table 4 
Impact of corruption on re-election in small and large winning coalitions
Dependent variable: 
Re-election (Ri )
























Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 295 295 250 250
Pseudo R2 0.1276 0.1522 0.2717 0.1821
Wald/F-test (p-value) 43.67 (0) 4.36 (0) 40.93 (0) 1.26 (0.19)
Note: Columns 1 and 3 report the results from the probit estimations (and they have the Wald test 
and a Pseudo R2 reported), while columns 2 and 4 report the results from the OLS estimations 
(which have the F-test and the regular R2 reported). The full list of control variables is the same 
as in column 4 of tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 4 presents the results and confirms the intuition where the effect of corrup-
tion on reelection is both higher and statistically significant in municipalities with 
a smaller W/S ratio (smaller winning coalition). This effect should be calculated 
as , where ki* is the marginal cutoff value of corruption while  and  
are estimated regression coefficients from equation (13). The cut-off value for cor-
ruption in small winning coalition environments is 25.2%. This means that politi-
cians maximize their chances of re-election when the share of suspicious procure-
ments in total procurements4 is about one fourth. This is a relatively high level of 
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407corruption persistence given that voters usually lack the necessary information to 
punish such behavior. In municipalities with a high W/S ratio (larger winning 
coalition) the effect is much smaller – the cut-off value of corruption is 10.1% – 
however it is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that corrup-
tion does not aid in re-election chances in large winning coalition environments, 
but only in small ones. In other words, in places where it is easier for politicians 
to form long-term connections with quasi-entrepreneurs, it is more likely that by 
engaging in such activities they will increase their chances of re-election. No such 
effect exists in areas where it is more difficult to successfully satisfy a group of 
key supporters. 
5.4 taXes, coRRUPtIon anD tHe W/s RatIo 
The final theoretical prediction is that small winning coalition environments 
should have higher tax rates. This section will present the results from equation 
(14) and will in addition test the reverse impact of corruption on tax rates. The 
main dependent variable represents the tax surcharge rate applied on top of the 
main income tax rate; however it will be referred to simply as local tax rate, given 
that this rate is under full jurisdiction of the local mayor and his or her administra-
tion. There is an upper boundary for how high each city or municipality can set 
this rate, which is based on population size, but any decision on tax rates within 
this boundary is carried out by the local mayor. It therefore makes sense to use this 
variable as yet another measure of a local mayor’s power structure. 
Graph 2 
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Note: Tax rates are predicted from equation (14). 
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408 Table 5 shows the results. Both the W/S ratio and the corruption index entail an 
effect on local taxes of roughly similar magnitude, but in different directions. For 
example, moving from a small winning coalition environment (W/S = 0.1) to a 
large winning coalition environment (W/S = 0.4) the local tax rate is estimated to 
be between 1.2 and 1.5 percentage points lower. This is a very large effect given 
that the mean local tax rate is 4.15%. In other words a small winning coalition 
environment is likely to be characterized by much higher tax rates (around 30% 
higher taxes), even when controlling for population size and all other important 
factors. Graph 2 shows this relationship graphically estimating the level of tax 
rates using the regression equation from column (4). Similarly, a move from a zero 
corruption to a high corruption environment (from 0 to 0.5 value of the corruption 
index) will increase local tax rates by between 1.5 and 2.6 percentage points. This 
effect, just like the previous one, is very large and statistically significant.
Table 5 
Impact of winning coalition size on local tax rates
Dependent variable: 
tax rate (ti )



























HDZ vote share 0.022(0.023)
0.013
(0.025)






















Controls No No No Yes
N 546 546 546 546
R2 0.0442 0.0958 0.1208 0.1513
F-test (p-value) 11.62 (0) 10.37 (0) 6.19 (0) 5.75 (0)
Note: OLS regressions performed throughout. Control variables include the municipality and 
city specific controls: Croats, Average age, Years of education, War disabled, Settlement size, 
and Assembly size. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes significance at 
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409Together these two effects confirm the intuition set out in the theoretical section, 
according to which tax rates are likely to be higher in small winning coalition 
environments where corruption is larger. In other words, cities and municipalities 
which are unlucky to be existing within a small winning coalition environment, 
where politicians can easily exploit the logic of political power to keep themselves 
in office for long periods of time, will have a mayor who is more likely to be 
corrupt and keep tax rates high. 
5.5 MatcHInG 
In order to get a better estimation of the potential causal effect of winning coalition 
environments on corruption, taxes, and tenure, a matching procedure is done in 
order to balance the treated and control units based on a set of used covariates. In 
our case the non-random treatment is the previously defined binary indicator of a 
small and large winning coalition environment, W/S_binary, where a small win-
ning coalition is given the value of 0, and a large winning coalition is given a value 
of 1. The covariates, with their summary statistics given in table 1, are the same 
control variables used throughout tables 2, 3 and 4. The balancing of the dataset is 
done with respect to these covariates in order to make the small and large winning 
coalition environments as similar as possible to draw a causal inference. 
In order to balance the dataset several matching techniques will be applied. This 
is done primarily as a robustness check so that our results do not depend on method 
specification. The first matching method is the default propensity score (PS) 
matching. In order to evaluate how good it balanced the dataset we need to per-
form visualizations of balance checks. Graph 3 reports how well each of the four 
used algorithms matched the covariates by showing the standardized biases (PS 
matching is shown in the first upper left panel). It reports the graphical results of 
a t-test on whether the mean value of each covariate is the same in the treatment 
and control groups. The closer the matched values (denoted by X in each of the 
graphs) are to the horizontal line, the lower the standardized bias across covari-
ates, and the better matched the sample gets. By observing the pre-matched means 
of the covariates (denoted by black dots in all charts of graph 3) it is easy to see 
that there were clear differences in the distributions of covariates before per-
forming the matching. For example, small winning coalition environments were 
already more likely to have smaller governing coalitions, greater mayor majori-
ties, and lower levels of political polarization which could have affected both total 
corruption and tenure in office. Running a regression without taking this into 
account could have overestimated the effect of the W/S ratio on both corruption 
and tenure. This is why it is important to perform a balancing of treatment and 
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410 Graph 3 
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Nearest neighbour matching
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Note: Each x-axis shows the standardized bias across covariates (the lower the bias, i.e. the closer 
the matched values to 0, the better the balancing), while each y-axis shows the list of covariates 
used in the matching procedure. 
Source: Author’s own calculations.
After matching, it is obvious that a better balance is achieved across all covariates 
(shown by X in each graph). The percentage differences in means in treated and 
control units across each covariate for all the algorithms are very low and statisti-
cally insignificant (the lowest p-value across all balance tests is 0.23), meaning 
that we can safely conclude that each matching algorithm produced a well-bal-
anced dataset. 
There are obvious differences however. Different matching techniques are usually 
applied until one of them delivers the optimally balanced dataset. Even though the 
default propensity score procedure did produce a reasonably well-balanced dataset 
(shown in the upper left panel of graph 3), other algorithms, in particular kernel, 
were matching even better. It should be mentioned that several different variations 
of each algorithm were tested until reaching the one with the lowest bias. Several 
values of the nearest neighbour algorithm were used (2, 3, 5, 10, and 12 nearest 
controls per one treatment). The nearest neighbour matching matches the best 
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411control to the treatment unit (hence neighbour). The upper right panel in graph 3 
shows the matched dataset using 10 controls per one treatment, and it is the one 
that had the lowest standardized bias. For radius matching, which establishes a 
maximum propensity score radius, and matches units based on an established cal-
liper, the following calliper values were used: 0.2, 0.1, 0.08, 0.05, 0.02., and 0.01. 
The final one, with a calliper of 0.01 was the best matched and is shown in the 
lower left panel of graph 3. Finally, the lower right panel shows kernel matching, 
where a normal and a tricube kernel types were used. Kernel matching uses a 
kernel-weighted average of the outcome for all control units, where the weight 
indicates a proportion of distance between control and treatment units. The tricube 
kernel type was the one that offered the lowest bias. The kernel algorithm bal-
anced the sample better than the other three chosen algorithms (it had the lowest 
overall standardized bias), with nearest neighbour matching coming in second. 
5.5.1 estimating the effect after matching
After having successfully achieved a balance between treatments and controls 
across all the covariates, the next step is to engage in estimation. Table 6 shows the 
estimates for a linear OLS regression of the treatment effect of a small winning 
coalition environment on tenure, corruption, and local taxes, across each of the 
balanced datasets for different matching algorithms (each column represents re-
sults for a different matching algorithm). The coefficients do not differ substan-
tially from each other. They all suggest a highly significant and negative effect of 
the W/S ratio on tenure, corruption, and taxes, as we have shown in sections 5.2 
to 5.4. In terms of effect size, a city or municipality with a small winning coalition 
increases tenure by an average of 6 to 12 months, increases corruption by an aver-
age 4.6 to 5.2 percentage points, and increases tax rates by an average of 0.8 to 1 
percentage points when compared to a similar city or municipality with a large 
winning coalition. These average treatment effects are not too different from the 
estimated coefficients reported in tables 2, 3 and 5, except in the case of the impact 
on corruption, where the effect is now several times larger. The reason for this is 
a different unit of comparison – in section 5.3 the estimated effect was looking at 
a one standard deviation increase in the W/S ratio (a change of the ratio by 0.1), 
whereas now we are interpreting an indicator variable change (the equivalent of 
which would be an increase of the W/S ratio by 0.3, which would according to 
table 3 yield an effect on corruption of 3.6 percentage points, which is still lower 
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412 Table 6 











Impact of W/s  









R2 0.3059 0.2221 0.2144 0.2430
F-test (p-value) 12.9 (0) 13.09 (0) 10.29 (0) 13.89 (0)
Impact of W/s  









R2 0.0846 0.088 0.0713 0.0912
F-test (p-value) 1.85 (0.04) 2.56 (0) 2.59 (0) 2.67 (0)
Impact of W/s  









R2 0.1855 0.1290 0.0962 0.1168
F-test (p-value) 4.85 (0) 3.81 (0) 4.25 (0) 4.29 (0)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 257 484 546 537
Note: The four matching algorithms are: (1) propensity score matching, (2) nearest neighbor 
matching, (3) radius matching, and (4) kernel matching. After each matching procedure an OLS 
regression was performed to estimate the impact of the W/S ratio on tenure, corruption and tax 
rates. The full list of control variables is the same as in column 4 of tables 2 and 3. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
5.5.2 entropy balancing and comparison of average treatment effects
The different matching algorithms all performed a decent balancing of the dataset 
and have all suggested a positive effect of small winning coalition environments 
on tenure, taxes, and corruption. In addition to the used algorithms there is another 
matching method that has proven to be even better and superior to all of the pre-
viously used ones. Entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) is a multivariate 
reweighting method that depends on specifying the moment conditions of covari-
ates in the treatment and control groups in order to match them. Its algorithm 
prevents the loss of information by predefining the balance conditions and as such 
“always [...] improves on the covariate balance achieved by conventional preproc-
essing methods” (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). This method also enables balancing 
across joint distributions of covariates, which is achieved by including interaction 
terms. Its main advantage over all other methods is its accuracy in balancing the 
sample, and consequentially its accuracy in establishing the treatment effect. 
When applying entropy balancing, the results are clear: it provides a much better 
match across the covariates than all four matching methods used in the previous 
section. Graph 4 compares on a single graph the differences in means for all the 
covariates (again looking at the standardized bias, as in graph 3). It compares the 
entropy balanced sample with the unmatched sample and the default propensity 
score matching procedure (replicated for the same interaction variables used in 
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413extremely well-balanced using the entropy balancing approach. All of the mean 
values of for the treatment and the control covariates are almost exactly the same. 
This clearly suggests a superior matching method and it implies that we are now 
able to perform a quasi-experimental estimation of the average treatment effect on 
exactly the same treatment and control units that differ in one single factor: having 
a small or large winning coalition environment. 
Graph 4 
A balanced sample using entropy balancing (triangles), compared with an 
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PS matchingUnbalanced Entropy balancing
Note: Entropy balancing performs an almost perfectly balanced sample against a set of 22 covar-
iates in total on the y-axis (these include all the covariates used in the initial estimations plus a 
few interaction terms created by the ebalancing algorithm). The x-axis measures the standard-
ized bias, the same as in graph 3. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
We now use the entropy balanced dataset to again generate the treatment effect of 
a small winning coalition on tenure, corruption, and taxes. The results are reported 
in table 7 comparing the estimates after entropy balancing, propensity score 
matching, and an OLS for the unmatched sample (these results differ from the 
initial ones estimated in tables 2, 3 and 5 given that the main independent variable 
is a binary indicator rather than a continuous variable). The coefficients for entropy 
balancing are slightly higher than the propensity score matching estimates, and 
carry greater statistical power. When compared to an unmatched dataset, the 
entropy balancing estimated coefficients are again larger and in the same expected 

































































41 (4) 387-420 (2017)
414 with a small winning coalition increases tenure by an average of 10 months, 
increases corruption by an average of 6 percentage points, and increases local tax 
rates by 1.2 percentage points when compared to a similar city or municipality 
with a large winning coalition. Each of these effects are not too different from the 
unmatched sample estimates, however they do present us with more robust 












Impact of W/s  







R2 0.2519 0.3059 0.2018
F-test (p-value) 23.88 (0) 12.9 (0) 20.49 (0)
Impact of W/s  







R2 0.0856 0.0846 0.0752
F-test (p-value) 3.09 (0) 1.85 (0.04) 5.21 (0)
Impact of W/s  







R2 0.184 0.1855 0.1245
F-test (p-value) 3.51 (0) 4.85 (0) 6.45 (0)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 546 257 546
Note: The first column reports the estimates of the three given relationships after entropy balanc-
ing, the second replicates the same results for propensity score matching from column 1 in table 
6, and the final are OLS estimates from an unmatched sample reported in column 4 of tables 2, 
3 and 5. The full list of control variables is the same as in column 4 of tables 2 and 3. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Based on the entire set of results from all matching procedures applied, the con-
clusion is that there is a positive causal effect of a small winning coalition envi-
ronment on tenure, corruption and taxes (adhering to the assumptions of the selec-
tion on observables approach). This means that in Croatia the systemic corruption 
is indeed supported by an environment in which institutional and legal frame-
works are personalized and hence discourage development. A city or municipality 
that has these characteristics is more likely to be subject to usurpation of budget-
ary resources for private gains and higher taxes by a politician that is likely to stay 
in power for a long period of time. 
6 conclUsIon 
This paper has made an important contribution to the existing literature on corrup-
tion and institutional deficits in Croatia. It has defined a specific environment in 
which corruption, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and high taxes 
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415ability and low transparency, local mayors can stay in power for long periods of 
time. Such mayors, because their tenure in office depends on satisfying only a 
selected group of loyal voters, are free to engage in corrupt activities as well as set 
high tax rates. The paper’s two main contributions have been a successful theo-
retical extension of the selectorate theory to include a direct link between small 
winning coalition environments and corruption, and a successful empirical verifi-
cation of the selectorate theory in Croatia that confirms the adverse effect of small 
winning coalitions on corruption, taxes, and tenure. We now have a systematic 
explanation of why Croatian voters do not punish corrupt politicians.
This explanation is arguably only one part of a much wider issue that includes 
mentality, culture, historical heritage, and a range of other factors. In addition, 
there are several potential drawbacks of the research. The dataset is limited to 
only a cross-section of corruption during a single political mandate. It would have 
been more intuitive to observe a time series of corruption, particularly to look at 
how things have changed before and after the 2009 elections when the new law 
granting more power to mayors had been enacted. Finally, the very definition of 
corruption could easily underestimate total corruption in a municipality given that 
it does not include an arguably even bigger source of local corruption – changes 
in urban planning laws. Future research should attempt to address these draw-
backs in order to make an even better indicator of corruption, and test it across 
several political terms. 
Even with these limitations the main contributions of the paper redefine Croatia 
within a new theoretical framework for analysis. The findings confirm that Croatia 
is a worrying phenomenon; however the logic of political survival of Croatian 
politicians is no different than in any other country. The difference is only in insti-
tutions that either prevent or encourage corrupt behavior. Countries with clear and 
enforceable rules manage to prevent power-hungry individuals from usurping 
social and market outcomes, while countries that lack such rules or lack enforce-
ability of existing rules are sentenced to vicious cycles of bad equilibria. A change 
of such a social order must come from an institutional push, encouraging both 
greater transparency and accountability to the voters, and credibly punishing poli-
ticians when they break the rules. 
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416 aPPenDIX
Table a1 
Variables used in analysis, their description and sources
Variable Description source
W/S ratio
Winning coalition divided  
by the entire selectorate  
(votes for incumbent divided  
by all eligible voters)






Weighted average of all the given 
proxies of corruption defined 
through various cases of potentially 
fraudulent public procurements
Vukovic (2017), based on 
interviews with key stakeholders 
in the procurement process. 
Source of procurements: Official 
Gazette of the Republic of 
Croatia: https://eojn.nn.hr/
Oglasnik/ 
Tax rate (prirez) Local tax surcharge rate  on income tax





Re-election =1 when incumbent mayor gets re-elected, =0 otherwise
State Electoral Commission  
of the RC 
Years in power Total years in power until 2013 State Electoral Commission  of the RC 
Turnout Municipality-level turnout in the 2013 local election
State Electoral Commission  
of the RC 
HDZ vote share Proportion of municipal vote for the HDZ in the 2011 national election
State Electoral Commission  
of the RC 
SDP vote share Proportion of municipal vote for the SDP in the 2011 national election




=1 when mayor from the same party 
as the national government;  
=0 otherwise
Glaurdić and Vuković (2017); 
source of original data: State 
Electoral Commission of the RC
EPI 
Electoral polarization index, based 
on municipality-level results in the 
directly preceding national election
Glaurdić and Vuković (2017); 
source of original data: State 




Number of seats the governing 
coalition has in the local assembly
Glaurdić and Vuković (2017); 
source of original data: State 
Electoral Commission of the RC
Mayor majority Proportion of deputies in the local council supporting the mayor
Glaurdić and Vuković (2017); 
source of original data: State 
Electoral Commission of the RC




Income Income per capita (deflated to 2010 levels), natural log transformed
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417Variable Description source
Grants Per capita grants (deflated to 2010 levels), natural log transformed
Ministry of Finance:  
http://www.mfin.hr/hr/lokalni-
proracun-arhiva 
Croats Proportion of population ethnically Croatian Croatian Bureau of Statistics
Average age Average age for entire population  in municipality Croatian Bureau of Statistics
Years of 
education
Average years of education for 
population older than 15 years of age Croatian Bureau of Statistics
War disabled 
per 1,000
Number of disabled persons whose 
disability was caused by war
Glaurdić and Vuković (2016); 
source of original data: Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics
Settlement size
Weighted average of settlement size 
in a municipality as a measure of 
urban-rural cleavage
Glaurdić and Vuković (2016); 
source of original data: Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics
Assembly size Total number of representatives  in the local assembly
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